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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
entitled to be present at a pretrial hearing, he has the constitutional
right to the assisfance of counsel in the cross-examination of accusing
witnesses.2 9 When considered in conjunction with Pointer, the
practical effect of Anderson is to make it virtually impossible for a
defendant to be the victim of an' unfair pretrial hearing since his
presence, both personally and as represented by counsel, is now
guaranteed. In this way, an accused's rights cannot be prejudiced.
Although it may be possible that a defendant's rights may be
adequately protected in his absence, as Blackstone 30 observed, and
as implied in Anderson, the semblance of justice is essential to a
fair hearing. The traditions ingrained in our concept of a fair
and impartial trial mandate that an accused be personally present,
and that complete justice cannot be effected in his absence.
)X
MILITARY LAW - MANDAMUS - JUDIcIAL REVIEW OF COURT-
MARTIAL CONVICTION PROPER IN ACTION TO CoMPEL SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE TO CHANGE PETITIoNEa's DISHONORABLE DISCHARGE. -
After having been convicted of assault by a general court-martial
in 1947, appellant was given a dishonorable discharge from the
Navy. During the military trial, when appellant's codefendant gave
unexpected testimony which implicated appellant, the common
counsel for both parties asserted that he could no longer effectively
represent both men. Counsel's request for withdrawal was denied
and he was ordered to proceed with the defense. Eighteen years
later, in an action in the nature of mandamus,' appellant sought
to compel the Secretary of Defense to change the record of his
dismissal and to issue him an honorable discharge. The Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit held that because appellant was denied
effective counsel during the court-martial, the Secretary of Defense
29 See Note, 11 CATHOLIC LAW. 244 (1965).
30 4 BLAcSN Or, COm MxTARmS *282-83.
1Appellant brought this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1964), which
gives the district courts "original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of
mandamus to compel an officer . . . of the United States . . . to perform a
duty owed to the plaintiff." Enacted at the same time, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)
(1964) permits the laying of venue, under the facts of this case in the district
of plaintiff's residence, and renders the defendant amenable to service of
process by certified mail beyond the territorial limits of the district in which
the action is brought. Prior to these provisions, an action in mandamus could
be brought only in the District of Columbia. E.g., Knickerbocker Ice Co. v.
Sprague, 4 F. Supp. 499 (S.D.N.Y. 1933). For a complete analysis of the
use of the mandatory injunction as a method of avoiding the former juris-
dictional limitations on mandamus, see Note, 38 CoLui. L. RFv. 903 (1938).
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had the duty to change appellant's dishonorable discharge. Ashe v.
McNamara, 355 F.2d 277 (1st Cir. 1965).
The eighth section of Article I of the United States Constitu-
tion provides, in part, that Congress shall have the power "to
make Rules for the Government and Regulation of land and naval
Forces." Pursuant to this power, Congress has enacted statutes,
and established courts-martial to pass upon any alleged violation of
military law.2 Moreover, Congress has accorded a certain degree
of finality to the decisions of military tribunals.3 Although a civilian
court has no direct appellate power over court-martial proceedings,'
the determinations of military tribunals are open to collateral attack
by habeas corpus. This latter form of review has historically been
limited to a determination as to "whether the military court had
jurisdiction of the person and the subject-matter, and whether
it had exceeded its powers in the sentence pronounced." '
Until 1946, the finality accorded court-martial determinations
was somewhat tempered by the power of Congress to change, by
private bill, the type of discharge ordered by a military court.6
Prior to that time, many private bills came before Congress request-
ing that it legislate "corrections" upon military records. 7 Burdened
by the quantity of these applications, Congress enacted Sections 131
and 207 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 19468 which
conferred authority upon the military departments to make record
changes. Section 131 of the act provided that "no private bill . . .
directing . . . the correction of a military . . . record, shall be
received or considered in [Congress]," 9 while section 207 allowed
the secretaries of the appropriate military departments, acting
through boards of civilian officers or employees, "to correct any
military.., record where in their judgment such action is necessary
to correct an error or to remove an injustice." 10
Following the passage of this act, Attorney General Clark was
requested to rule as to whether the secretary of a military depart-
2 Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1964); see
Carter v. Roberts, 177 U.S. 496, 497-98 (1900).
3 See 10 U.S.C. § 876 (1964); Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U.S. 365, 401
(1902) ; Carter v. Roberts, supra note 2, at 498.
4 See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 8 (1946); Carter v. Roberts, supra
note 2, at 498; Williams v. Heritage, 323 F.2d 731 (5th Cir. 1963).
5 Carter v. Roberts, supra note 2, at 498.
6 See Redd, The Board for Correction of Naval Records, 19 JAG. J. 9
(1964); 40 Ops. ATr'y GE-. 504 (1947).
"See Redd, supra note 6. These statutes made many changes including
provision for the alteration of a retirement date and the vacatur of a dishon-
orable discharge. 40 Ops. A-ey GEN. 504, 505-06 (1947).
860 Stat. 812-52 (1946).
9 Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, ch. 753, § 131, 60 Stat. 831
(1946).
1oLegislative Reorganization Act of 1946, ch. 753, §207, 10 U.S.C.
§ 1552(a) (1964).
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ment was empowered to change records resulting from court-
martial proceedings.:' The Attorney General concluded that section
207, when read in conjunction with section 131,12 necessarily per-
mitted a secretary to change the type of discharge given by a
court-martial.13  He noted, however, that "the language of section
207 cannot be construed as permitting the reopening of the pro-
ceedings, findings, and judgments of court-martial so as to disturb
the conclusiveness of such judgments, which has been long recog-
nized by the courts." -4 In other words, the correction of record
and issuance of a new discharge was regarded as an act of clemency
or mitigation. The nature of the relief afforded remained the same
as was previously provided by congressional act.15
As a result of a secretary's power to correct records, a more
difficult problem arose, viz., the extent to which his exercise of
this power would be subject to judicial review. In general, the
judiciary has been reluctant to question any administrative military
determination.' 6 It has been frequently stated that the courts are
without jurisdiction to review such rulings since Congress placed
the administration of the armed forces solely within the discretion
of the executive branch.'
7
[Jiudges are not given the task of running the army .... The military
constitutes a specialized community governed by a separate discipline from
that of the civilian. Orderly government requires that the judiciary be as
scrupulous not to interfere with legitimate Army matters as the Army must
be scrupulous not to intervene in judicial matters.' 8
Except where the Constitution requires judicial review, it is
within the power of Congress to grant or withhold this power.
When Congress is silent and the Constitution does not require it,
the question of review depends upon the entire setting of the
particular statute and the scheme of regulation which is adopted. 9
140 Ops. ATT'y GEN. 504 (1947).
1240 Ops. Arr'y GEN. 505 (1947).
"340 Ops. Arr'Y GEN. 509 (1947).
3.440 Ops. Arv'y GEN. 508 (1947).
15 Ibid.
16 E.g., Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 93-95 (1953); United States
ex rel. French v. Weeks, 259 U.S. 326, 335-36 (1922). See also It re Yama-
shita, supra note 4, where the Court stated that as far as courts-martial are
concerned, the judiciary has no power to review directly, but it has judicial
power "to grant writs of habeas corpus for the purpose of an inquiry into
the cause of restraint of liberty."
17 E.g., United States ex rel. French v. Weeks, sapra note 16; Reaves v.
Ainsworth, 219 U.S. 296, 306 (1911); see also U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, art. II,
§2.
is Orloff v. Willoughby, supra note 16, at 93-94.
19 See Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 120-23 (1946), where the
Court- held that such a provision making draft board determinations final,
does not, however, preclude judicial inquiry as to whether the draft board's
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Thus, Congress may expressly or impliedly require that military
action be treated as final by the courts. In this regard, the legis-
lative history of section 207 sheds little light upon the reviewability
of correction board determinations. When the section was enacted
in 1946, Congress gave no indication of the intended scope of
further review. 20  In 1951, Congress added a finality clause to
section 207 stating that: "a correction under this section is final
and conclusive on all officers of the United States." 21 This amend-
ment was apparently passed to overrule the Comptroller General's
refusal 22 to recognize the power of the secretaries to make full
financial settlements attendant upon the alteration of a record.2 3
When the bill to amend section 207 was introduced in the House,
it provided that settlement within its purview "shall be final and
conclusive on all officers of the Government, including review by
the courts of the United States. .. "24 Sub-committee concern 2 5
over the phrase "including review by the courts" spurred its deletion
"so that under appropriate circumstances the courts . . . might
review these matters.126  Thus, the availability of judicial review
depends upon undefined "appropriate circumstances."
While neither the legislative history27 nor the decisions s
relating to section 207 clearly define the scope of review which will
be given to a decision rendered by a secretary, Harmon v. Brucker 29
established that such rulings are not immune from all judicial
inquiry. The petitioner in Harmon was dismissed from the Army
with less than an honorable discharge (for activities committed prior
to his induction), and thereafter sued the Secretary of the Army
demanding that he be issued an honorable discharge. The Govern-
ment contended that the courts were powerless to review this action
because: (1) it was within the secretary's discretion to determine
decision had any basis in fact. See also Gentila v. Pace, 193 F.2d 924 (D.C.
Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 943 (1952).
20 See Ashe v. McNamara, 355 F.2d 277, 280-81 (1st Cir. 1965).
21 10 U.S.C. § 1552(a) (1964).,- (Emphasis added.)
2227 DEcs. ComP. GEN. 665 (1948).
23 Ashe v. McNamara, 355 F.7d 277, 281 (1st Cir. 1965).
24 See H.P. REP. No. 449, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1951). (Emphasis
added.)
25 See Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Hose Committee on Armed
Services o H.R. 1181, 82 Cong., 1st Sess. 369, 377, 391-93, 398 (1951).26Id. at 450. (Emphasis added.) See H.R. RP. No. 449, 82 Cong.,
1st Sess. 3 (1951).
2 Conpare Friedman v. United States, 310 F.2d 381, 404 (Ct. C1. 1962)(appendix), with Jones, Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts to Review the
Character of Military Administrative Discharges, 57 COLUm. L. REv. 917,
967-71 (1957).
23 See Betts v. United States, 172 F. Supp. 450 (Ct C1. 1959); Eicks v.
United States, 172 F. Supp. 445 (Ct. CI. 1959) ; Friedman v. United States,
158 F. Supp. 364 (Ct. Cf. 1958).29355 U.S. 579 (1958).
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the'type of discharge which would be issued to petitioner; and
(2) the secretary's decisions were, by statute, unreviewable.30 In
rejecting these contentions, the Supreme Court determined that the
secretary exceeded his authority by issuing the discharge for pre-
induction activities. The Court held that: "judicial relief is avail-
able to one who has been injured by the act of a government official
which is in excess of his express or implied powers." 31 Thus, the
Court impliedly construed the finality clause of section 207 so as
to provide for some judicial review.
In the instant case, Judge Hastie, speaking for the Court,
examined section 207 and concluded: first, that the secretaries, acting
through correction boards, were empowered to change discharges
pursuant to courts-martial; and secondly, that the finality clause
was designed solely to preclude review by Government officers, and
was not intended to foreclose proper judicial review.32  In addition,
the Court cited precedent authorizing examination of administrative
action covered by a finality clause where the action challenged is
"violative of [a] constitutional right . . . illegal or without basis
in fact."' ' 3
In reviewing the record of appellant's court-martial, the Court
stated that forcing defense counsel to represent two men, whose
testimony was contradictory, was a procedure so fundamentally
unfair that if appellant were still imprisoned, he would have been
released on a writ of habeas corpus.34 It was, therefore, apparent
to the Court that appellant's constitutional rights had been violated.
Mandamus, however, will issue only where there is a clear legal
right, and an equally plain legal duty. 5 The Court found that under
section 207, changing the discharge was not a matter of discretion
since the sentence had been unconstitutionally imposed, and thus,
there was a plain legal duty to change the record.3 6
It is significant that the Court, in the instant case, based its
decision upon the initial determination that a writ of habeas corpus
would have been issued had appellant been incarcerated. 37 His-
30 Id. at 581.31 Id. at 581-82.32 Ashe -. McNamara, spra note 23, at 280-81.
33 Id. at 281.34 Id. at 279-80.
35 See Coombs v. Edwards, 280 N.Y. 361, 21 N.E.2d 353 (1939) ; 55 CJ.S.
Mandamus § 1 (1948).36Ashe v. McNamara, supra note 23, at 282.
37 While habeas corpus is the most common method of civil inquiry, other
available procedures include: an action for a declaratory judgment (Jackson
v. McElroy, 163 F. Supp. 257 (D.D.C. 1958). But see Goldstein v. Johnson,
184 F2d. 342 (D.C. Cir. 1950)); a suit for back pay (Shapiro v. United
'States, 69 F. Supp. 205 (Ct. Cl. 1947)) ; an action for wrongful imprisonment
(McLean' v. United States, 73 F. Supp. 775 (W.D.S.C. 1947)). For an
excellent discussion of collateral review, see Bishop, Civilian Judges and
[ VOL. 41
9 RECENT DECISIONS
torically, the single issue presented in such a proceeding was whether
the military court had jurisdiction over the person and the subject
matter.3 It is interesting to note, however, that the scope of review
available on a petition for habeas corpus has been significantly
expanded in cziijan criminal trials. The Supreme Court has ruled
that a violation of due process may cause the trial court to "lose"
jurisdiction.39 In light of this consideration, the Supreme Court,
in Burns z. Wilson,40 recognized that deprivation of constitutional
rights might also render void the jurisdiction of a court-martial.
In Burns, the Court said: "The constitutional guarantee of due
process... protect[s] soldiers-as well as civilians-from the crude
injustices of a trial so conducted that it becomes bent on fixing guilt
by dispensing with rudimentary fairness .. ."'I The Court stated,
however, that as long as the military had fully and fairly reviewed,
and had not manifestly refused to consider the petitioner's position,
the civil courts were precluded from re-evaluating the military
determination. 42  The Supreme Court thus expanded military habeas
corpus to encompass constitutional guarantees, but at the same time
seemingly restricted its practical application.4 3
Surprisingly, the Court in the instant case did not mention
the limitation inherent in the Burns decision-that fair military
review precludes civil court inquiry. This omission might lead oie
to conjecture that the Court assumed that where a defect is patent
on the record there is no necessity for further investigation as to
whether the military's review of the conviction was fairly conducted.
Since the guidelines established by Burns are well settled,"4
it is unlikely that the Court's failure to mention them constitutes
their rejection. Therefore, it may be surmised that the impact of
Military Justice: Collateral Review of Court-Martial Convictions, 61 COLTUM.
L. Rxv. 40 (1961).
3s See Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 81 (1857).
39 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938). Thus, in civilian trials,
the writ of habeas corpus was expanded to allow relief: for lack of counsel
(Johnson v. Zerbst, supra); for admission of coerced confessions (Leyra v.
Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954) ); and for suppression of evidence (United
States ex rcl. Almeida v. Baldi, 195 F2d 815 (3d Cir. 1952), cert. denied,
345 U.S. 904 (1953) ).
10 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
41 Id. at 142.
42 Id. at 142-44.4 3Prior to Application of Stapley, 246 F. Supp. 316 (D. Utah 1965),
wherein petitioner successfully alleged unfairness in court-martial procedure
due to inadequate counsel at a special court-martial, there were apparently no
reported cases in which a petitioner-soldier obtained his liberty by a writ of
habeas corpus. See Bishop, supra note 37, at 60-61, which offers a possible
explanation for this situation.
44 See, e.g., Thomas v. Davis, 249 F.2d 232, 233-34 (10th Cir. 1957);
Easley v. Hunter, 209 F.2d 483, 487 (10th Cir. 1953).
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the instant case is limited to cases where there has not been full
and fair military review.
In practical effect, Ashe v. McNamara may provide an avenue
for judicial relief to ex-servicemen who would otherwise be without
a remedy. 5 Moreover, it seems that the secretaries of the various
military departments are now compelled to change the records of
applicants who were denied their constitutional rights.
Apparently, the instant case presents the first time that a court
has, under section 207, ordered a secretary to change a court-martial
discharge. In doing so, the Court found that the finality provision
of the section did not preclude any "otherwise proper judicial
review." The Court justified the instant review on the authority of
Supreme Court decisions which held reviewable allegedly final
administrative actions when these actions were in excess of authority
.given, were in violation of a constitutional right, or were without
basis in fact. In that a court-martial which has no jurisdiction
over the defendant is a nullity, and provides no basis or justification
for a dishonorable discharge, it appears that the instant Court's
review of the secretary's decision is well founded.
-5 It should be noted, however, that relief under § 207 may be precluded
by the statute of limitations which provides: "No correction may be made...
unless the claimant . . . files a request therefor before October 26, 1961, or
within three years after he discovers the error or injustice, whichever is later.
However, a [correction] board . . . may excuse a failure to file within three
years after discovery if it finds it to be in the interest of justice." 65 Stat.
655-56 (1951), 10 U.S.C. § 1552(b) (1964).
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